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INSURANCE
W. Shelby McKenzie*
INSURANCE OF THE PERSON
Moore v. Prudential Insurance Co. I concerned a claim under an
accidental death and dismemberment policy which excluded loss
caused by disease or bodily infirmity.2 The plaintiff had developed
osteomyelitis, a bone infection, following two previous fractures,
which condition each time had become quiescent after lengthy conva-
lescence. When the plaintiff suffered a third fracture, the treating
physician decided to amputate because any attempt to save the
plaintiff's leg would undoubtedly result in a flare up of osteomyelitis.
The Louisiana supreme court allowed recovery of the policy benefits
for loss of a leg, finding that a pre-existing latent or dormant condi-
tion does not prevent recovery where the accident is the "predomi-
nant, moving, proximate cause"3 of the loss.' Similarly, Martin v.
American Benefit Life Insurance Co.5 involved a claim for disability
benefits under a health and accident insurance policy which excluded
loss "caused wholly or in part, directly or indirectly by any disease,
defect or infirmity. ... 6 The plaintiff claimed disability from an
automobile accident which resulted in aggravation of his pre-existing
arthritic condition. The Louisiana supreme court again allowed re-
covery, finding that the pre-existing condition was dormant and
would not have been disabling without the injury received in the
accident. The court's "proximate cause" test appears to be directly
contrary to the clear and unambiguous limitations of coverage in the
policies.'
* Special Lecturer in Law, Louisiana State University; Member, Baton Rouge
Bar.
1. 278 So. 2d 481 (La. 1973).
2. The policy covered "loss of life, sight or limb as a result, directly and indepen-
dently of all other causes, of bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent
and accidental means ... " In addition, the policy excluded any loss caused "directly
or indirectly, by . . . disease or bodily. . . infirmity, or medical or surgical treatment
thereof. . . or bacterial infection." Id. at 482.
3. Id. at 483.
4. Both the trial court and the court of appeal had denied recovery. See Moore v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 263 So. 2d 456 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
5. 294 So. 2d 200 (La. 1974).
6. The policy insured "against loss . . . resulting from bodily injuries effected
solely, directly and independently of all other causes through EXTERNAL VIOLENT
AND ACCIDENTAL MEANS, which . . . shall not be caused wholly or in part;
directly or indirectly by any disease, defect or infirmity .. " In addition, the policy
excluded disability "caused or contributed to directly or indirectly, wholly or partly:
(1) By disease in any form .... " Id. at 201.
7. In Jennings v. Louisiana & S. Life Ins. Co., 290 So. 2d 811 (La. 1974), the
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The life insurance policy in Suire v. Combined Insurance Co.'
required that suit be brought within four years and sixty days after
death. The policy was discovered by the beneficiary eight years after
the death of the insured. Although the Louisiana supreme court up-
held the validity of a clause fixing a reasonable time in which to
institute suit on a policy, the court accepted the general rule from
other jurisdictions that failure to file suit because of ignorance of the
policy does not defeat recovery where the failure to discover the policy
was not due to the fault of the beneficiary.
LIABILITY AND RELATED COVERAGE
Under prior revisions of comprehensive general liability policies,
the courts had concluded that the policy in effect when the negligence
occurs provides coverage even though the damage does not result
until after the policy expires.9 To avoid this interpretation, insurers
redrafted the comprehensive general liability policy to provide cover-
age on an "occurrence" basis." In Oceanonics, Inc. v. Petroleum Dis-
tributing Co.," the Louisiana supreme court held that insurers had
achieved their purpose, finding there was nothing contrary to public
policy in excluding coverage for damage sustained after the expira-
tion of the policy even though the delictual act was committed during
the policy period. 2
Louisiana supreme court held that silicosis was an "injury" and not a "sickness,"
notwithstanding the fact that silicosis is classed as an "occupational disease" under
the workmen's compensation laws. The policy provided more lucrative benefits for
disability from injury.
8. 290 So. 2d 271 (La. 1974).
9. The leading case is Kendrick v. Mason, 234 La. 271, 99 So. 2d 108 (1958).
10. The applicable policy language is set forth in the court of appeal decision in
Oceanonics, Inc. v. Petroleum Distrib. Co., 280 So. 2d 874, 876 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973):
"In connection with the completed operations coverage, the policy also pro-
vides that:
"'The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of...
property damage to which this insurance applies, caused by an
occurrence.'
"The word 'Occurrence' is defined in the policy as meaning ... 'an accident,
including injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy
period, in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from
the standpoint of the insured.'
"The policy also stipulates that, 'This insurance applies only to bodily injury
or property damage which occurs during the policy period within the policy terri-
tory.' "
11. 292 So. 2d 190 (La. 1974).
12. A similar result was reached in Mut v. Newark Ins. Co., 289 So. 2d 237 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1974). In another supreme court case dealing with the definition of
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Many professional liability and errors and omissions policies are
written on a "claims made" basis. These policies provide coverage for
negligent acts occurring during the policy period provided the claim
is also made against the insured during the policy period. In
Livingston Parish School Board v. Firemen's Fund American Insur-
ance Co.,' 3 an engineer was covered under a professional liability
policy during the time he was engaged in the construction of a build-
ing.'4 Three days after he allowed his policy to lapse, the building
collapsed. In dismissing the engineer's claim against his insurer, the
Louisiana supreme court held that the policy unambiguously limited
coverage to acts discovered and reported during the policy term and
that such coverage condition was not contrary to public policy. 5
Reichart v. Continental Insurance Co.'" presented the res nova
issue whether the insurer's obligation to defend included the obliga-
tion to appeal a judgment adverse to the insured. Accepting the mi-
nority position among other states, the First Circuit Court of Appeal
held that the insurer does have the obligation to appeal where a
substantial interest of the insured reasonably may be served or pro-
tected by appeal. In Reichart, the court found there was a serious
issue whether the award beyond the policy limits was excessive;
therefore, the insurer was obligated to appeal." This decision appears
to be a fair interpretation of the policy language.'"
"occurrence," numerous plaintiffs sued for property damage caused during a canal
construction project. The court refused to accept the insurer's contention that the
entire project was one occurrence as defined in the policy which would have limited
total recovery by all plaintiffs to the stated limits of liability for one occurrence. The
court concluded that the damage sustained by each plaintiff was a separate occur-
rence. Lombard v. Sewer & Water Bd., 284 So. 2d 905 (La. 1973).
13. 282 So. 2d 478 (La. 1973).
14. The policy provided:
"(a) During the Policy Period
"The insurance afforded by this policy applies to errors, omissions or negli-
gent acts which occur within the United States of America, its territories or
possessions, or Canada during this policy period if claim therefore is first made
against the insured during this policy period." Id. at 480 n.2.
15. The insurance industry cites inflation as the justification for policies written
on a "claims made" or "occurrence" basis. Such policies permit the payment of current
claims out of current premiums which have been adjusted to reflect current awards
and loss experience. Of course, these provisions also discourage an insured from allow-
ing his coverage to lapse which generates more premium dollars.
16. 290 So. 2d 730 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 294 So. 2d 545 (La. 1974).
17. Id. at 735. The court also awarded penalties and attorney's fees under LA. R.S.
22:658 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1958, No. 125, holding that an insurer's failure
to properly interpret its own policy, even if the issue is res nova, does not constitute a
reasonable ground for refusal to pay.
18. The only policy language quoted by the court was: "'[Tihe company shall
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The courts have continued to broaden uninsured motorist cover-
age by striking down any policy provision standing in the way of
stacking the statutory minimum coverage per vehicle. The most sig-
nificant extension occurred in Wilkinson v. Firemen's Fund Insur-
ance Co., "9 in which the insured was allowed to stack the limit of
liability for each vehicle under a single policy covering three vehi-
cles."0 Rascoe v. Wilburn"' is the first case to involve the 1972 amend-
ments to R.S. 22:1406 which introduced the concept of "underin-
sured" motorist coverage.2" The case permits stacking of coverage
under separate policies to aggregate uninsured motorist coverage in
amounts in excess of the liability coverage of the negligent motorist.
The opinion is not clear as to whether the insureds are entitled to
recover the total uninsured motorist limits in addition to the liability
coverage or whether their recovery is limited to the amount by which
their uninsured motorist coverage exceeds the applicable liability
coverage.23 The 1972 amendment seems clearly to restrict recovery to
the latter. However, where injuries justify such an award, the 1974
amendment of R.S. 22:1406 now appears to allow recovery of the total
defend any suit alleging such bodily injury or property damages which are payable
under the terms of the policy, even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless,
false or fraudulent.' " 290 So. 2d at 732.
Some policies contain additional language similar to the following: "But the com-
pany shall not be obligated . . .to defend any suit after the applicable limit of the
company's liability has been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements."
Such provision should negate any obligation to appeal when the insurer elects to satisfy
the trial court judgment against it, thereby exhausting its limits of liability.
19. 298 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 302 So. 2d 304 (La. 1974).
20. Prior decisions, including the Louisiana supreme court decisions in Deane v.
McGee, 261 La. 686, 260 So. 2d 669 (1972), and Graham v. American Cas. Co., 261
La. 85, 259 So. 2d 22 (1972), all involved the stacking of the limits of liability for two
or more vehicles insured under separate policies.
Several cases nullified exclusions designed to prevent coverage when the insured
was occupying another "owned" vehicle. Chateau v. Smith, 297 So. 2d 268 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1974); Thomas v. Nelson, 295 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974); Rascoe v.
Wilburn, 295 So. 2d 201 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974); Roberie v. State Farm Mutual Auto.
Ins. Co., 291 So. 2d 293 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974). The Chateau and Thomas cases
permitted insureds with automobile policies to recover for injuries sustained by riding
uninsured motorcycles.
21. 295 So. 2d 201 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
22. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(2)(b) (Supp. 1964), as amended by La. Acts 1972, No.
137: "For the purposes of this coverage the term 'uninsured motor vehicle' shall,
subject to the terms and conditions of such coverage, also be deemed to include an
insured motor vehicle when the automobile liability insurance coverage on such vehicle
is less than the uninsured motorist coverage carried by an insured."
23. The trial court had granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment. The
case was reversed and remanded.
[Vol. 35
1975] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1973-1974 419
uninsured motorist limits in addition to the liability coverage of the
negligent motorist.24
R.S. 22:636 provides that written notice of cancellation "must be
actually delivered or mailed to the insured." In Broadway v. Alistar
Insurance Corp.,2 5 the Louisiana supreme court held that this statute
requires actual receipt of the notice of cancellation. Proof of deposit
of the cancellation in the mail creates only a prima facie presumption
of delivery which can be overcome by proof of non-delivery.26
The landmark Louisiana supreme court decision in Canter v.
Koehring Co., 7 firmly established the legal basis for a claim by one
employee against a fellow employee of the same corporation arising
out of the breach of a duty delegated to the fellow employee by the
corporation. The financial reward in most such claims comes from the
extension of coverage in the comprehensive general liability policy to
include "executive officers" as additional insureds. In Galloway v.
Employers Mutual," a shop foreman who was in charge of the entire
manufacturing operation of a small corporation was held to be an
"executive officer" within the meaning of the insurance policy. There
was a persuasive dissent on the issue of contributory negligence. The
majority opinion on this issue will strain the credulity of most read-
ers. The fact that the majority found it necessary to engage in such
forced logic to make an award to a seriously injured workman is
compelling evidence that tort law is not the proper vehicle for com-
pensation of industrial accident victims. The legislature should enact
a fair workmen's compensation system which provides adequate ben-
efits for truly disabled employees as their exclusive remedy against
both their employer and fellow employees.
24. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(2) (Supp. 1964), as amended by La. Acts 1974, No. 154:
"For the purposes of this coverage the term uninsured motor vehicle shall, subject to
the terms and conditions of such coverage, also be deemed to include an insured motor
vehicle when the automobile liability insurance coverage on such vehicle is less than
the amount of damages suffered by an insured and/or the passengers in the insured's
vehicle at the time of an accident, as agreed to by the parties and their insurers or as
determined by final adjudication."
25. 285 So. 2d 536 (La. 1973).
26. In this case the agent rather than the company had sent the notice of cancella-
tion. After reviewing the agency contract, the court also concluded that the agent had
no authority to cancel the policy and that its attempt to do so was ineffectual. Follow-
ing Broadway, the court in Automobile Club Ins. Co. v. Aaron, 296 So. 2d 464 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1974), found that the insured had overcome the presumption with testi-
mony that neither the insured nor the mortgage holder had received notice of cancella-
tion.
27. 283 So. 2d 716 (La. 1973).
28. 286 So. 2d 676 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 290 So. 2d 333 (La. 1974).
